FOUNDATIONS: THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE

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So startling are its revelations, so contrary to what civilized man has been taught for generations, that they would be unbelievable but for the impressive weight of the scientific agencies backing the survey.*

Note how impressive is the word "scientific." And how false. How dangerous to society if foundations support the theory that social problems can be scientifically solved by mere interviewing techniques. Apart from the doubtful veracity of the samples of men and women questioned by Kinsey, his statistical methods have been seriously criticized by organs of the American Statistical Association and several scholarly reviewers. But even if the sampling had been representative of American attitudes on sex, and even if all the persons interviewed had been willing to give truthful answers and were psychologically capable of doing so, it seems preposterous to propose that social change should be justified upon empirical inquiry alone.

Should concepts of value (legal, religious, ethical ideas) be abandoned merely because any number of men find them oppressive and neglect to live up to them? Are we justified in advocating a change in the criminal law because certain types of crimes are practiced widely? Shall we abrogate punishment for speeding, for theft, for adultery, for fraudulent voting, for income-tax evasion, if we find that such illegalities are practiced by a majority? By twenty percent of our people? By eighty percent? What percentage of our population must express itself, either by response to interviews or by action, in favor of an illegality to convince a social scientist that the law proscribing it should be abrogated? Similar questions might be asked in relation to the weighing of existing ethical concepts such as patriotism, respect for parents and elders, and tolerance of dissidence.

The basic fallacy of the Kinsey approach and that of the ruling research clique in the social sciences stems from a confusion between what is a fact, what is an expression of opinion, and what is an a priori concept of value. The puerile doctrine that change

is always necessary has led many of these "scientists" to believe that there are no longer any "inalienable rights," no longer any unchanging duties. They deem themselves justified, with the support of foundation grants, to label their prejudices as truth and to experiment with society. The Reece Committee report puts it thus:

It seems to this Committee that there is a strong tendency on the part of many of the social scientists whose research is favored by the major foundations toward the concept that there are no absolutes, that everything is indeterminate, that no standards of conduct, morals, ethics and government are to be deemed inviolate, that everything, including basic moral law, is subject to change, and that it is the part of the social scientists to take no principle for granted as a premise in social or juridical reasoning, however fundamental it may heretofore have been deemed to be under our Judeo-Christian moral system.*

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER, PRODUCED BY THE SSRC

Poll taking has become one aspect of the fact-finding mania. Professor Hobbs testified regarding The American Soldier, a book prepared and edited under the auspices of The Social Science Research Council. He described the process by which social scientists, against the repeated objections of the military authorities, managed to "incorporate their own ideas in a matter of highest military significance." This was the method of discharge to be used by the military forces at the end of hostilities in World War II. Most of these "scientists" were foundation connected. Their work was praised by Frederick Osborn, a trustee of The Carnegie Corporation, as a "typical example of social-science prediction." What was this "example"? These "scientists" decided that men should be discharged individually from the army according to a table of weighted factors, and that these factors should be determined by taking a poll of the men themselves. In

[•] Ibid., p. 71.

[•] Ibid., p. 72.

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other words, regardless of military necessities, the men were to determine what weight should be given to length of service, front-line duty, and other factors in determining the order of release.

The traditional method of demobilization called for the successive release of whole units from the armed forces, leaving unimpaired the strength of the remaining units. The method recommended by the social scientists, based upon alleged "scientific" findings, shattered the effectiveness of individual units.

These "scientists" prevailed. As a result, there can be little doubt that, if we had been forced into a resumption of hostilities, our army would have been reduced to a nadir of inefficiency. As the Committee report put it:

The military policymakers were defeated by the social scientists. This was another victory in the struggle of the "social engineers" to gain control of all the throttles of control.

* * * A few more such victories for "social engineering" might indeed be fatal.*

In his statement filed with the Reece Committee, Mr. Charles Dollard, President of the Carnegie Corporation, defended the authors of The American Soldier, holding that our military forces themselves initiated the study and, inferentially, were responsible for the outcome. Obviously enough, the study could not have been made without express military authorization. But it is inconceivable that any truly military minds could have initiated the study. Nor does that seem to have happened. The introduction to The American Soldier states that the officers responsible for advancing the project were General George C. Marshall and Brehon Somervell. But the actual officer in charge was General Frederick Osborn. General Osborn was no professional soldier. He had been a civilian, an official of a factoring company, and it is of no little consequence that he was a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation. He had achieved some attention in social-science circles through various writings. His service in the army, where he rose to the rank of major general, seems to have been confined to the nonmilitary work of acting as director of the Information and Education Division, the unit through which the studies of demobilization methods were made.

Among General Osborn's staff were Dr. Samuel A. Stouffer, director of the professional staff, Dr. Carl I. Hovland, and Dr. Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., all identifiable as closely associated with The Social Science Research Council. In all probability it was some of these men, or some of the employed consultants, who generated the idea of the study. A two-page list of such consultants appears in the beginning of volume II of *The American Soldier*; many of these, in later reviews of the book, expressed enthusiastic praise for the work to which they had contributed.

The introduction boasts: "Never before had modern methods of social science been employed on so large a scale by such competent technicians." It also said: "The conservatism natural to professional men everywhere, and often particularly ascribed to the professional soldier, was broken down by the imaginative grasp of the abler leaders." It would be interesting to know the full story of how these "leaders"-if military men were meantwere sold this "grasp." At any rate, while the book cites that even the President approved of the project, it states: "The idea of a point system for demobilization had been conceived in the Research Branch * * *." This branch of the armed forces was operated not by military men but by social scientists. It is equally clear that there was powerful and consistent opposition to the point system from truly military men who realized how disastrous to our security the suggested discharge system could become. This point system contributed substantially to that grave weakness in our forces which left us unprepared for the Korean War, coming so soon after the close of World War II.

Looking back, it is incredible that a group of so-called "scientists" could have been so blind to reality as to propose that military decisions be made through the process of finding out what the soldier in the ranks wanted. Moreover, the scientific value of this effort to justify a military decision by the poll-taking

method has been questioned by many critics. Arthur M. Schles. inger, Jr., a historian who is certainly not suspect of being a conservative, lashed out at the study in a review, "The Statistical Soldier." He said:

Too many obvious frauds were at last committed in the name of sociology * * * So the old and toothless beast was put out to pasture. In its place has come its more carnivorous son, known in his more modest mood under some such name as "social relations," or, more often, in a tone of majestic simplicity, as "social science" * * *

Well, the "social science" machinery has been grinding away for some years now. Occasionally skeptics approach the devout and say with proper humility: You have basked in the smile of the deans and in the favor of foundations. You are discovering the secret of the ages. We wish to share in the new enlightenment you are bringing us. But what, oh wise one, should we read? Can you name a single book that would give some idea of the great revelations that lie in wait? The oracle at that point used to become muffled. Then one began to hear of The American Soldier. This work one was told was the real stuff: this would settle the doubts.*

Schlesinger continues:

Indeed, the more basic questions are raised, not by relatively innocuous practice of "social science" but by its mystique-its pretensions to Know Knowledge and new certitude-Most of The American Soldier is a ponderous demonstration in NEWSPEAK of such facts as [one can] find described more vividly and with far greater psychological insight in a small book entitled Up Front by Bill Mauldin. What Mauldin may have missed will turn up in the pages of Ernie Pyle. * * * Bursting onto university campuses after the war, overflowing with portentous if vague hints of mighty wartime achievements (not, alas, to be disclosed because of security), fanatical in their zeal and shameless in their claims, they [the social scientists] persuaded or panicked many university administrators into giving their studies priority. Needless to say, they scored an even more brilliant success with foundations. Certain foundation directors even decided that virtually all their funds for research in the social sciences should be expended on projects of the "social science" variety; the individual scholar, so far as they were concerned, was through. * * * The whole [is] happily subsidized by the foundations, carrying to triumphant completion their ancient hope of achieving the bureaucratization of American intellectual life.

Apart from his criticism of the underlying scientific fadism, Schlesinger considers The American Soldier a "harmless book." But most of the social scientists (and perhaps General Marshall also) considered The American Soldier a monumental contribution to military policy and to the social sciences. In the words of Paul Lazarsfeld, one of the project's consultants: "The results of both volumes are without parallel in the history of the social sciences."

The American Soldier comprised two out of four volumes of a series. The flyleaf says:

The four volumes in this series were prepared and edited under the auspices of a Special Committee of the Social Science Research Council comprising

Frederick Osborn, Chairman

Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.

Leland C. De Vinney

Carl I. Hovland

John M. Russell

Samuel A. Stouffer

Donald Young, ex officio.

The data on which these volumes are based were collected by the Research Branch, Information and Education Di-

Partisan Review, August 1949.

vision, War Department, during World War II. In making the data available the War Department assumes no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations contained in these volumes, which are the sole responsibility of the authors.

These volumes were prepared under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. That corporation is not however the author, owner, publisher or proprietor of the publication, and is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or views expressed therein.

(This last reservation is typical of the method by which some foundations seek to use the "risk capital" theory and yet escape

all responsibility for unhappy risk.)

In Items, the official publication of The Social Science Research Council, issue of March 1949, an anonymous author boasts: "The point system was actually invented by the Research Branch and 'sold' to the Army on the basis of attitude studies made in all parts of the world." According to the SSRC, more than a half million soldiers were studied. These American soldiers were guinea pigs for social scientists, to satisfy their curiosity and their penchant for statistical analyses. Their persuasive promises of military benefits had sold the program to the authorities. This gave the associated professors jobs in Washington during the war time and an opportunity to gain prestige for a mysterious contribution to the war effort. It also almost wrecked our military strength.

FOUNDATIONS GENERATE THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND

In the face of the evidence produced by the Reece Committee, to deny that the major foundation complex slanted its research and its work to the left is futile. An example is the production of *The Proper Study of Mankind*, written by Stuart Chase, at the instance of Donald Young, then of The Social Science Research Council, and Charles Dollard, then of The Carnegie Corporation, to portray the condition and functioning of the social sciences.

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Mr. Chase was a write, among other 1942. This work

^{*} Report, p. 85. † Macmillan.

[†] Macmillan. § Supra, p. 287.